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"WHENEVER JUSTICE REQUIRES": EXAMINING THE
ELUSIVE ROLE OF GUARDIAN AD LITEM FOR
ADULTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY
Donna S. Harkness*
Representation of clients with diminished capacity is an essential
component of elder law practice.' In cases where an elder law
attorney is able immediately to discern the presence of
diminished capacity during an initial interview, the
representation can be directed so as to regularize the
relationship, either through appointment of an attorney-in-fact
(if the client still has sufficient capacity to do so) or by
petitioning for appointment of a guardian or conservator to
make decisions and manage the client's affairs.2 Unfortunately,
in real life, where litigation is involved, a practitioner is often
confronted with either an unexpected and sudden decline in a
client's capacity or is asked to step into a lawsuit where an
incapacitated client's rights are already at issue and time is of
* Donna S. Harkness is an Associate Professor of Clinical Law and
Director of the Elder Law Clinic at the University of Memphis Cecil C.
Humphreys School of Law. She is a certified elder law attorney and
member of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys. The author
thanks her Humphreys research fellow, Lara Ashley Hendrix, for her
assistance in legal research and proofreading.
1. A. KIMBERLEY DAYTON ET AL., ADVISING THE ELDERLY CLIENT § 2:6 (2006).
2. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2006). The rule authorizes a
lawyer to seek appointment of a general guardian in the case of exigent
circumstances that may otherwise result in irreparable harm. Id. cmt. 9. An
attorney may file a petition seeking appointment of a general guardian or
conservator for his own client when absolutely necessary to preserve the client's
interests. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 96-404, at 6-
7 (1996). However, the attorney may not represent any other party petitioning for
such appointment, nor may the attorney himself seek to be appointed as guardian
or conservator. Id. at 7-8.
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the essence.3 In such cases, where the client is incapable of
assisting counsel in preparing the case or is unable to make
decisions concerning case management, the filing of a petition
for conservatorship places the attorney, who is supposed to be
litigating on the client's behalf, in an adverse role to the client.
Even if another party, such as a relative, is available to
independently pursue the guardianship or conservatorship,
such proceedings are still unavoidably cumbersome and
lengthy, thus delaying the progress of the already pending
litigation.' Examination by at least one physician may be
required, which the client may resist.5  Pursuit of such
proceedings adds to the expense of the representation. Finally,
the granting of a conservatorship or guardianship will subject
the client to a loss of autonomy that otherwise might have been
avoided. 6
As an alternative to general guardianship, federal7 and
states court rules provide for appointment of a guardian ad litem
3. See Joseph A. Rosenberg, Adapting Unitary Principles of Professional
Responsibility to Unique Practice Contexts: A Reflective Model for Resolving Ethical
Dilemmas in Elder Law, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 403, 408-09 (2000).
4. See, e.g., John E. Donaldson, Reform of Adult Guardianship Law, 32 U. RICH. L.
REV. 1273, 1274 (1998).
5. See generally A. Frank Johns, Ten Years After: Where is the Constitutional Crisis
with Procedural Safeguards and Due Process in Guardianship Adjudication?, 7 ELDER L.J.
33 (1999) (discussing guardianship and procedural safeguards that have been
incorporated into guardianship proceedings as a result of modem reform efforts).
A number of states have enacted versions of the Uniform Guardianship and
Protective Proceedings Act (hereinafter U.G.P.P.A.). See U.G.P.P.A. §§ 1-101 to
1-404 (1982), 8A U.L.A. 435 (2003); U.G.P.P.A. §§ 101 - 504 (1997), 8A U.L.A. 301
(2003). Physician examinations are mandatory under the 1982 Uniform Act.
U.G.P.P.A. § 2-203 (1982), 8A U.L.A. 478-79 (2003). The 1997 Act makes the
evaluation discretionary with the court unless the respondent demands one, in
which case the court must order it. U.G.P.P.A. § 306 (1997), 8A U.L.A. 358 (2003).
6. Ellen S. Pryor, After the Judgment, 88 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1796 (2002).
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 17(c).
8. Although a majority of the states have adopted the Federal Rule without
modification, twenty-three states have made some revision and/or addition. See R.
ALA. SUP. CT. 17(d); ARIz. R. Civ. P. 17(i); ARK. R. Civ. P. 17(b); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 372; IND. R. TRIAL P. 17; KY. CT. R. 17.03; MD. R. CIV. P. 3-202; MICH. CT. R. 2.201;
MINN. R. Civ. P. 17.02; Miss. R. CIv. P. 17(c); MONT. R. CIv. P. 17(c); N.Y. C.P.C.R.
1202 (Consol. 2005); N.C. R. Civ. P. 17(b); N.D. R. Civ. P. 17(b); OR. R. CIV. P. 27(B);
PA. R. Civ. P. 2053; S.C. R. Civ. P. 17; TENN. R. Civ. P. 17.03; TEX. R. Civ. P. 173.4;
UTAH R. CIV. P. 17(b); VA. CODE ANN. 8.01-9 (Supp. 2000); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 17(c);
Wis. R. CIV. P. 803.01(3).
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for purposes of representing the client within the context of the
individual lawsuit only. However, unlike the statutory schemes
which govern guardianships and conservatorships, the rules for
appointment of a guardian ad litem provide virtually no
guidance concerning the process that is to govern such
appointments, when such appointments are appropriate, who is
qualified to be appointed, the role the appointee is to play in the
litigation, and other such critical issues.' This lack of guidance
raises concerns about the potential for violation of an elderly,
incapacitated person's due process rights in connection with
guardian ad litem appointments, as the guardian ad litem is
charged with managing the litigation and potentially authorized
to compromise and settle the incapacitated person's rights in
connection with whatever cause of action is being litigated on
that person's behalf.10
Consider the case of Ms. Oldage, age eighty-two, who
accompanied by her niece consults a lawyer. Ms. Oldage is frail
and a little confused but still able to coherently relate to the
attorney the events that brought her to his office. A lonely
widow, with no close relatives, she had become enamored with
a fifty-year-old handyman who offered to repair her bathroom
fixtures without charge. A few months later, the helpful
handyman moved in with the widow, despite the fact that he
was already married to a woman his own age (a fact he did not
disclose to Ms. Oldage). Soon, the handyman's name was listed
beside hers on all of her bank accounts, and he was the one
writing all of the checks, most of which were payable to cash or
to himself. Finally, when the money in the bank accounts ran
out, the handyman took Ms. Oldage to see a friendly real estate
investment company, telling Ms. Oldage that she needed to take
9. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c); R. ALA. SUP. CT. 17(d); ARIz. R. CIv. P. 17(i); ARK. R.
CIV. P. 17(b); CAL. CODE CIV. PROc. § 372; IND. R. TRIAL P. 17; KY. CT. R. 17.03; MD. R.
Civ. P. 3-202; MICH. CT. R. 2.201; MINN. R. CIv. P. 17.02; MISS. R. Civ. P. 17(c); MONT.
R. Civ. P. 17(c); N.Y. C.P.C.R. 1202 (Consol. 2005); N.C. R. CIV. P. 17(b); N.D. R. Civ.
P. 17(b); OR. R. CIV. P. 27(B); PA. R. Civ. P. 2053; S.C. R. CIv. P. 17; TENN. R. CIV. P.
17.03; TEx. R. CIv. P. 173.4; UTAH R. CIV. P. 17(b); VA. CODE ANN. 8.01-9 (Supp. 2000);
W. VA. R. Civ. P. 17(c); WIS. R. CIv. P. 803.01(3).
10. See 25 FED. PROC., L. ED. Infants and Incompetents § 59.91 (2006).
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out loans against her rental properties and then, several months
later, her home. The "loans" turned out to be purchases (at
discount prices) of each property, with the investment company
representative stating that he had been told by the handyman
that Ms. Oldage needed money to pay bills. The helpful
handyman then cashed the checks from these sales and
disappeared, leaving Ms. Oldage alone to face the action for
eviction brought by the friendly real estate investment company.
The attorney files suit to enjoin the eviction and seeks rescission
of these transactions; he is successful in keeping Ms. Oldage in
her home during the ensuing two-year pendency of the
proceedings. Now, a settlement offer has been made. The
attorney has arranged to meet with Ms. Oldage in his office. The
niece, who was in her fifties, regrettably died in the interim.
Ms. Oldage is more frail after two years and no longer can
relate the events connected with the financial exploitation as she
once could. She has turned to her neighbor across the street,
another man in his fifties, who accompanies her to your office.
He insists on being present for discussion of the settlement offer,
and Ms. Oldage, when asked, confirms that she wants him there.
He interrupts repeatedly and discusses Ms. Oldage's
exploitation. The attorney cannot discuss the settlement offer
alone with his client because she wants the neighbor present
and, in fact, wants him to decide whether or not to accept the
offer.
What can the attorney do? Can he allow the neighbor to
decide? Is it time to withdraw?" Is it permissible for the
attorney to file a petition for general guardianship or
conservatorship against his own client?12 Would appointment of
a guardian ad litem to assess the suitability of the settlement
offer be appropriate? Can the attorney ask for such
11. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 6 (2006) (stating that a
client with "severely diminished capacity" may "lack the legal capacity to discharge
the lawyer," thus leaving the lawyer to consult Model Rule 1.14 for guidance).
12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2006). Although this rule
specifically deals with clients with diminished capacity, it provides less than a
crystal clear guide for the attorney's behavior. Id.
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appointment?
An elder law attorney may also find herself appointed as a
guardian ad litem, with all its ethical and practical complexities.
Consider the case of an elderly prison inmate with Alzheimer's
disease who is being sued for divorce. The inmate's interest in
marital property and possible allocation of a portion of his
pension rights to the wife are at issue. The court appoints you to
act as the inmate's guardian ad litem pursuant to your state's
version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (hereinafter Federal
Rule) 17(c).13 Are you to function as a substitute for a registered
agent for service of process - someone who can accept service of
legal papers on behalf of the incapacitated inmate so that the
estranged spouse can proceed with her lawsuit? Are you
obligated to look after the inmate's best interests? Are you to
function as legal counsel so as to defend against the divorce?
These two hypothetical situations, widely divergent as they
are, illustrate the difficulties that face elder law practitioners
attempting to provide legal representation to clients with
diminished capacity. Both of these elderly individuals clearly
are in need of assistance even though they have not been
formally adjudicated as lacking capacity.
GUARDIANS AD LITEM
Federal Rule 17(c) provides:
Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a
representative, such as a general guardian, committee,
conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative
may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or
incompetent person. An infant or incompetent person
who does not have a duly appointed representative
may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or
incompetent person not otherwise represented in an
action or shall make such other order as it deems
proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent
13. See FED. R. CIv. P. 17(c).
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person.14
Most states have enacted a rule patterned after the Federal
Rule, some with significant revisions that will be discussed
below in the section addressing the qualifications for
appointment of guardians ad litem.15 The Tennessee state civil
procedure rule changes the Federal Rule language slightly,
substituting the phrase "whenever justice requires" for the "as it
deems proper" language of the Federal Rule.16 Since the court's
determination of what is proper presumably is in accord with the
requirements of justice, the two versions appear to be equivalent,
but the reference to the notion of justice adds a valuable nuance
when one considers the proper role of guardians ad litem
appointed pursuant to Federal Rule 17. A guardian ad litem who
simply functions to facilitate litigation by accepting service of
process or signing off on settlements would not seem to be what
"justice requires," but such a placeholder concept of the role
might suffice for what a court "deems proper."7
The section below begins by discussing the role of the
guardian ad litem within the context of an adversarial legal
system. Next, the substantive standards that should be used in
deciding when appointment is appropriate are examined, and the
procedural due process issues are considered. Qualifications
14. Id.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 85-92.
16. TENN R. Civ. P. 17.03.
17. In actuality, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the "whenever justice
requires" language in Tennessee's Rule 17.03 does not impose any more rigorous
standard than that found in the federal rule. In Gann v. Burton, 511 S.W.2d 244
(Tenn. 1974), the court held that the "whenever justice requires" language "places
the appointment of the guardian ad litem within the sound discretion of the trial
judge." Id. at 246. In a case where a minor was represented by counsel, the trial
court declined to appoint a guardian ad litem. Id. The Supreme Court found that
this refusal did not result in any prejudice to the minor and was at most a
"hypertechnical" and harmless error. Id. at 247. As Professors Banks and Entman
have written, the result is "troubling," as it leaves the attorney who is representing
the incompetent party with "no responsible party" to look "to make litigation
decisions .. . and to protect ... against overreaching. . . ." ROBERT BANKS, JR. &
JUNE ENTMAN, TENNESSEE CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 6-1(o) (Matthew Bender 2006). As
Banks and Entman say, "[A] more satisfactory reading of Rule 17.03 would be that
appointment of some representative other than the litigation attorney is
mandatory." Id.
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required for appointment to the role of guardian ad litem are
explored, and the guidelines that exist to govern performance of
the guardian ad litem role are surveyed among the states. The
final section provides a brief reflection on the models available
for substitute decision making.
The conclusion proposes, to the extent that insufficient
guidance appears to exist, guidelines derived from what appears
to work for those guardians ad litem appointed to represent
juveniles and for those appointed to act as guardians ad litem
within the context of guardianship or conservatorship
proceedings, as well as from policy considerations relevant to the
relatively limited context of litigation.
BACKGROUND
The American legal system is predicated on the notion that a
contest between fully adversarial parties, forced to confront each
other within a system of evenly applied procedural and
evidentiary rules before an impartial trier (or triers) of fact, will
achieve a just outcome.'8 Obviously, when one of the parties is
not capable of pursuing or protecting her legal interests due to
impairment, the system is dysfunctional. The concept of a "next
friend"' 9 or guardian ad litem to substitute for the impaired or
incapacitated adversary is necessary to preserve the integrity of
the theoretical construct of American jurisprudence. 20
Unfortunately, as integral as it would appear to be on a
theoretical basis, in practice, the concept has remained elusive
and ill-defined.21 Professor Joan O'Sullivan has noted that the
18. Robert Gilbert Johnston & Sara Lufrano, The Adversary System as a Means of
Seeking Truth and Justice, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 147, 147-48 (2002); see also Marvin
E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975);
Roger C. Cramton, Furthering Justice by Improving the Adversary System and Making
Lawyers More Accountable, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1599 (2002) (both providing critical
assessments of the adversarial system).
19. Johns, supra note 5 at 37.
20. See Jennifer L. Wright, Protecting Who From What, and Why, and How?: A
Proposal for an Integrative Approach to Adult Protective Proceedings, 12 ELDER L.J. 53,
55-56 (2004).
21. See Joan L. O'Sullivan, Role of the Attorney for the Alleged Incapaciated Person,
2006]1 7
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guardian ad litem appointed in cases involving petitions for
conservatorship or guardianship "acts as the 'eyes of the court' to
further the 'best interests' of the alleged incompetent," but that
the role often is "so unclear that the attorney may choose" to
define the role as he or she sees fit.22 Professors Lidman and
Hollingsworth describe a similar elasticity in the parameters of
the guardian ad litem role in child custody cases?3
Black's Law Dictionary defines a guardian ad litem as "[a]
guardian, [usually] a lawyer, appointed by the court to appear in
a lawsuit on behalf of an incompetent or minor party." 24 Under
the former Equity Rules that preceded the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the focus of such an appointment was clearly to
provide substitution for the role of the litigant with the emphasis
on defense or prosecution of lawsuits, even for those under
guardianship. 25  It is here that the rule, suggests the
appropriateness of oversight by the court itself, stating that while
incapacitated persons may sue by "their guardians, if any, or by
their prochein ami, [this is] subject . .. to such orders as the court
or judge may direct for the protection of infants and other
persons."26 The Equity Rules have been superseded by the Rules
31 STETSON L. REV. 687, 687 (2002).
22. Id. at 688.
23. Raven C. Lidman & Betsy R. Hollingsworth, The Guardian Ad Litem in Child
Custody Cases: The Contours of Our Judicial System Stretched Beyond Recognition, 6
GEO. MASON L. REV. 255, 256-60 (1998). Efforts have been made to address this. See
ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN IN ABUSE
AND NEGLECT CASES (1996), http://www.abanet.org/child/repstandwhole.pdf (last
visited Aug. 12, 2006).
24. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 725 (8th ed. 2004).
25. See 28 U.S.C. § 723, Equity Rules Reference Table, at 3255 (1946); Bryant
Bros. Co. v. Robinson, 149 F. 321, 330 (5th Cir. 1906) (holding that "the equity rules
[adopted pursuant to Rev. St. U.S. § 917] have the force and effect of law"). Equity
Rule 70 read as follows:
Guardians ad litem to defend a suit may be appointed by the court, or by
any judge thereof, for infants or other persons who are under
guardianship, or otherwise incapable of suing for themselves. All infants
and other persons so incapable may sue by their guardians, if any, or by
their prochein ami; subject, however, to such orders as the court or judge
may direct for the protection of infants and other persons.
JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 301 (8th ed. 1933).
26. E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Federal Civil Procedure Rule 17(c), Relating to
Representation of Infants or Incompetent Persons, 68 A.L.R.2D 752, 752 n.1 (1959).
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of Civil Procedure, 27 but the former language is important
because it indicates that the problem of adequate protection of
and decision-making for those who have diminished capacity
within the legal system is of long standing.
Much of the litigation about guardians ad litem, however,
revolves around the issue of when and whether the appointment
of the guardian ad litem is required. 28 Consideration of the actual
role played by the guardian ad litem once appointed has received
much less judicial treatment, 29 but it appears to be no less
important in terms of preserving the integrity of the legal system.
WHEN APPOINTMENT IS "PROPER"
Determining the appropriateness of the appointment of a
guardian ad litem for an adult is controversial.30 Unlike minors,
who as a matter of law are deemed incapable of decision making
and are properly within the domain of the state's parens patriae
authority,31 the case for assisting and thus intruding into an
adult's life is much less clear, especially when there has been no
adjudication of incompetence or diminished capacity. 32 The
adult's constitutional right to autonomy precludes intervention if
the adult is in no way incapacitated.33
However, as anyone who represents older persons knows,
capacity is seldom an all or nothing proposition. Where clients
are either totally lacking in decision-making ability or totally
competent, the client's status is easily determinable and decisions
concerning implementation of protective measures are clear cut.M
27. FED. R. CIV. P. 86(a) advisory committee's note.
28. See Schopler, supra note 26, at 753-59 n.12.
29. See, e.g., Schopler, supra note 26 (listing no cases that address the guardian
ad litem's role in the proceedings).
30. See Wright, supra note 20, at 66-67.
31. Marvin Ventrell, The Practice of Law for Children, 66 MONT. L. REV. 1, 8-12
(2005).
32. Wright, supra note 20, at 55-56.
33. See Johns, supra note 5, at 62-63.
34. A.B.A. COMM. ON LAW & AGING & AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N,
ASSESSMENT OF OLDER ADULTS WITH DIMINISHED CAPACITY: A HANDBOOK FOR
LAWYERS 20, 21-22 (2005) (hereinafter HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS).
2006] 9
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If the client is in a coma, for example, the need for a guardian ad
litem is obvious. The difficult cases involve those that fall within
the fluctuating capacity continuum of the client who is able to
comprehend some things but not others, and who consequently is
capable of making some decisions but not others.35 The client's
capacity and decision-making capability may itself be in flux,
depending on the time of day, side effects of medications,
familiarity with surroundings, stress, and myriad other factors.36
The California Court of Appeals engaged the issue of the
proper evidentiary standard to justify appointment of a guardian
ad litem in the case of Kern County Dep't. of Human Services v.
Taylor D. (hereinafter In re Sara D.). 37 In re Sara D. involved a
petition for dependency based on two counts of dependency and
neglect of Sara D., a six-year-old alleged to be out of her
mother's control.38 The mother, Taylor D., was alleged to suffer
from bipolar disorder and personality disorder. 39 As might be
expected, these problems made it difficult for the mother's court-
appointed counsel to represent her.40  The court-appointed
counsel, therefore, asked the court either to allow him to
withdraw (making him the second attorney to do so) or to appoint
a guardian ad litem.41 At a conference in chambers, requested
35. Id. at 5-9.
36. Id. at 27-30.
37. 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (Ct. App. 2001).
38. Count I asserted that the mother was "unable to control" the child's
"extreme behavior," putting the child at risk of "serious harm or illness." Id. at 911.
The home environment also was alleged to constitute a "health and safety hazard."
Id. The second count alleged that "Sara has suffered or is likely to suffer serious
emotional damage as a result of [her mother's] conduct." Id.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 911. Clients with diminished capacity are not always difficult.
Those with Alzheimer's disease or senile dementia may in fact be too malleable,
necessitating safeguards to ensure that the client's interests are not subsumed by
those of the attorney. See A. Frank Johns & Bernard A. Krooks, Elder Clients with
Diminished Capacity: NAELA's Response to Specific Case Applications and Its
Development of Aspirational Standards that May Cross Professional Organizational
Boundaries, 1 NAELA J. 197, 199-200 (2005). But when a client is combative, the
representation can be extremely frustrating, as the client's failure to understand the
issues and to appreciate the need to communicate and cooperate with the attorney
undermines the client's case. See id. at 205.
41. In re Sara D., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 911.
10 [Vol. 8
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and attended only by the attorneys, the court considered a report
from the mother's therapist, which diagnosed her as suffering
from borderline personality disorder and found it to be consistent
with the court's previous observation of the mother's behavior.42
The court also considered that a previous attorney had already
withdrawn as counsel, that a contested matter concerning
jurisdiction was before the court and required resolution, and that
it would be in the mother's best interests to have a guardian ad
litem appointed to assist the mother's counsel in preparing and
explaining the proceedings to her.43 The case was set for a
hearing, and the mother, her attorney, and the guardian ad litem
were present at this hearing." However, no proof was
presented. 4 5 Instead, the mother's attorney notified the court that
he consulted with the mother's therapist and the guardian ad
litem, who had approved a decision to settle the case.46 Because
the case had been settled with an agreement to amend some
aspects of Count I and to eliminate the allegations of Count H,
the attorney did not contest the allegations of Count I relative to
the mother's inability to control the child.4 7 Two weeks later, at
the conclusion of the dispositional hearing, the court heard
testimony from the mother and father, and the court granted both
physical and legal custody of the child to the father and
supervised visitation to the mother. 48
On appeal, the mother challenged the appointment of the
guardian ad litem on grounds of insufficient evidence and
deprivation of due process rights. 49 The first issue concerned the
proper evidentiary standard for such appointments, and the
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 911-12.
45. Id. at 912.
46. Id. The settlement removed the allegations concerning the hazardous
conditions of the home from Count I, amended the allegation that the mother was
bipolar to reflect instead that she suffered from borderline personality disorder, and
eliminated Count II of the complaint against the mother entirely. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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appellant mother argued for imposition of the same standards as
those used for appointment of a conservator.s0 The State argued
for use of the standard employed to determine whether a
defendant was mentally incompetent to defend against criminal
proceedings.51 The court analyzed California precedent and
determined that neither test had been used exclusively, or was
mandated for exclusive use by child custody statutes, to
determine when appointment of a guardian ad litem was
warranted. 52 The court then held that if a preponderance of the
evidence existed in the record to support either standard, then
appointment of the guardian ad litem was justified.5 3 Under the
record presented in In re Sara D., the appellate court found that
the evidence was not sufficient to support either standard because
the court below had relied on the conclusory statements of the
mother's counsel.4
In re Sara D. is instructive because it highlights the often
unspoken divergence in the standards employed when courts
determine whether appointment of a guardian ad litem is
"proper." 5 As articulated under California law, the
50. Id. The standards for appointment of a conservator under the applicable
California statute are either that the person is "unable to provide properly for his or
her personal needs for physical health, food, clothing or shelter," CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 1801(a) (West 2002), or is "substantially unable to manage his or her own financial
resources or resist fraud and undue influence," CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(b).
51. In re Sara D., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 912-13. The California criminal code states
a person "is mentally incompetent . . . if, as a result of mental disorder or
developmental disability, the [person] is unable to understand the nature of the
criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational
manner." CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367(a) (West 2000).
52. In re Sara D., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d, at 913-14.
53. Id. at 914.
54. Id. at 919.
55. In the first place, the appointment of a guardian ad litem under Rule 17(c) is
not mandatory, but rather it is within the court's discretion. Roberts v. Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co., 256 F.2d 35, 39 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Noble, 269 F. Supp. 814, 815
(E.D.N.Y. 1967). Where the interests of the incapacitated litigant appear to be
adequately protected, no guardian ad litem appointment is necessary. Roberts, 256
F.2d at 39. The Tennessee Supreme Court, in interpreting Tennessee's Rule 17.03,
held that the "whenever justice requires" language requires the court to "evaluate
the total situation surrounding the infant or incompetent and then, if justice
requires, a guardian ad litem must be appointed." Gann v. Burton, 511 S.W.2d 244,
246 (Tenn. 1974). Even then, the appointment remains "discretionary." Id. at 246-
47.
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conservatorship standard looks to the person's ability to conduct
daily affairs and engage in ordinary decision making.56 The
criminal competency standard, on the other hand, is directed
toward the person's ability to understand and assist in litigation.57
The latter approach, with its emphasis on navigating the
courtroom environment, actually appears to be the more
appropriate standard for a guardian ad litem appointed pursuant
to Federal Rule 17(c) or one of the equivalent state rules, and it
should be the standard used to inform the court's sound discretion
of when appointment is "proper."
WHAT PROCESS Is DUE
In addition to the substantive issue of when appointment of a
guardian ad litem is appropriate, procedural due process concerns
are raised by a court's appointment of a guardian ad litem.58
Federal Rule 17(c) contains no procedure governing such
appointments.59 As noted above, the Federal Rule simply directs
the court to act to make an appointment "as it deems proper"
when there is no representative.60 Examination of much of the
case law indicates that guardian ad litem appointments are often
made almost reflexively upon receipt of any assertion of
diminished capacity.61 In Neilson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 62
this lack of procedure resulted in a challenge to the appointment
of the guardian ad litem on due process grounds. 63 The case
illustrates the tension between the client's right to autonomy and
need for protection. The plaintiff, Francine Neilson, was a
former employee of Colgate-Palmolive (hereinafter Colgate),
56. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 1801(b) (West 2002).
57. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1367 (West 2000).
58. Johns, supra note 5 at 69.
59. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
60. Id.
61. Schopler, supra note 26 at 760; see also Thomas v. Humfield, 916 F.2d 1032,
1034 (5th Cir. 1990) (psychiatrist selected by defendant determined plaintiff was
incompetent).
62. 199 F.3d 642 (2d Cir. 1999).
63. Id. at 651-54.
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suing under Title VII alleging employment discrimination and
retaliation.64 During the course of the proceedings, Ms. Neilson's
counsel withdrew, referencing a "deteriorating relationship" with
Ms. Neilson that was precluding the firm from providing
"effective representation."65 Several months following the
withdrawal, Colgate discovered that Ms. Neilson had been
ordered to undergo inpatient psychiatric treatment following her
discharge from Colgate.66 The employer filed motions under
Federal Rule 35, seeking a psychiatric examination of Ms.
Neilson, and under Federal Rule 17(c), seeking appointment of a
guardian ad litem for her.6 7 Ms. Neilson was unrepresented and
appeared pro se. 6 8 The federal district court granted the motion
for psychiatric examination at Colgate's cost, and ordered Ms.
Neilson to comply with the order or face dismissal of her
lawsuit.69  Ms. Neilson complied, and the court-appointed
psychiatrist found that she was seriously delusional and suffering
from "a severe Chronic Paranoid Disorder."70 The psychiatrist
recommended that Ms. Neilson "be found incompetent" and
noted that she had asked "that a [g]uardian be appointed to
pursue the litigation," apparently during the psychiatric
examination.7 1
The court issued an order setting a hearing date to consider
the psychiatrist's recommendation and to decide on the Federal
Rule 17(c) motion.72 As part of the order, the court extended to
Ms. Neilson the option to consent to the appointment of the
guardian ad litem in writing.73 Ms. Neilson wrote a letter in
64. Id. at 646. Ms. Neilson alleged discrimination based on race and sex. Id.
Although she was the mother of an adult son, she did not bring suit under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. See id. at 646, 648.
65. Id. at 646.
66. Id. at 647.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
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response, stating that she consented to the "appointment of a
guardian ad litem in addition to an attorney."74 Ms. Neilson
ended her letter by stating that she was "not competent to litigate
this case." 7 On the date originally set for the hearing on the
motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem, the court
appointed a guardian ad litem and cited the psychiatrist's report,
Ms. Neilson's consent, and its own findings as support for the
order of appointment. 76
Assuming that Ms. Neilson was competent to give informed
consent to the appointment of the guardian ad litem, it is clear
that her consent was conditioned on concurrent appointment of
legal counsel. This is an indication that Ms. Neilson recognized
her shortcomings as a legal advocate on her own behalf and that
she desired the appointment of someone who would aggressively
pursue her claims of discrimination. Unfortunately, in general
there is no right to free legal counsel in civil cases, even for the
indigent.7 The record does not suggest that Ms. Neilson was
unable to afford counsel. She simply failed to retain substitute
counsel to replace the attorneys that had withdrawn.78 To the
extent that her consent may have been predicated on the
misconception that both counsel and a guardian ad litem would
be appointed for her, it would seem to be voidable.79
The dissenting opinion details attempts Ms. Nielson made to
communicate to the court her desire for appointment of legal
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 647-48. Defendant Colgate was ordered to pay the first $10,000 of the
guardian ad litem's fees, indicating that it may have been as much in Colgate's
interests to have a substitute decision-maker as it was in Ms. Neilson's interests, at
least from the standpoint of getting the case resolved. Id. at 648.
77. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1981) (limiting an
indigent's "right to appointed counsel" to those situations involving the potential
for loss of liberty in the event the indigent party does not prevail). Courts may elect
to appoint counsel in cases where fundamental rights are at stake, such as
deprivation of medical treatment amounting to a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, or pursuant to statutory authority. See Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d
1001, 1006-07 (7th Cir. 2006).
78. See Neilson, 199 F.3d at 648.
79. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 372 (1997).
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counsel to represent her.8 0 In a later letter to the court, Ms.
Neilson suggested her consent was the product of duress and was
issued because she was afraid that her lawsuit would be
dismissed unless she agreed.81 As a consequence, the majority
opinion declined to uphold the guardian ad litem appointment on
the basis of Ms. Nielsen's consent.82 Instead, the court concluded
that the procedural defects present in the case, the lack of notice
and opportunity to be heard, provided "reasonable" notice,83 and
were remedied by the trial court's subsequent monitoring of the
guardian ad litem's performance.84
The actual performance of the guardian ad litem thus
becomes relevant in evaluating the correctness of this holding.
The court-appointed guardian ad litem conducted an
investigation and determined that Ms. Neilson's case was not
"triable" due to her mental illness. 85 The guardian ad litem
engaged in settlement discussions with counsel for Colgate, and
within two months an agreement had been reached and was
announced to the court by the guardian ad litem and counsel for
Colgate at a status conference.86 A third lawyer was present, the
attorney for Ms. Neilson's son, who had filed a petition seeking
to be appointed as general guardian for his mother in state court.87
Under state law, once he was appointed as general guardian, the
80. Neilson, 199 F.3d at 660-61 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 660.
82. Id. at 653 n.5.
83. Id. at 653.
84. Id. at 652.
85. Id. at 648. Specifically, the guardian ad litem consulted with the court-
appointed psychiatrist, who opined that "Nielson's paranoid ideation was present
early in her employment with Colgate and may have been present all of her life; ...
by 1993, it had consolidated into a full-blown paranoidal delusional system; and ...
a delusional psychosis has persisted ever since, centering on Colgate but
incorporating into it anyone else who impacts on her life." Id. at 648 n.2.
86. Id. at 648. The guardian ad litem negotiated a settlement that released all of
Ms. Neilson's civil rights claims, including her statutory right to attorney's fees, in
return for Colgate's pledge to "cooperate fully and use its best efforts to assist" Ms.
Neilson in applying for disability benefits, to pay her $2,500 per month until she
either received such benefits or turned sixty-five, whichever came first, and to fund
up to $50,000 of amounts expended in her attempt to obtain such benefits. Id. at
648-49.
87. Id. at 648.
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son would be the appropriate party to make decisions for his
mother pertaining to the lawsuit.8 8 The son's lawyer asked the
court to postpone final approval of the proposed settlement until
the court proceedings required for appointment of his client as
general guardian were concluded.89 As further support for this
request, an affidavit from Ms. Neilson's former counsel asserted
that Ms. Neilson's case was eminently "triable" and that a more
favorable settlement than the one being proposed should be
considered based on this fact.90 Despite this, the court approved
the settlement brokered by the guardian ad litem without waiting
for the appointment of the general guardian.91 A general
guardian subsequently was appointed for Ms. Neilson (a person
other than the son), and the guardian appealed the order
approving the settlement. 92
The first issue on appeal was whether the guardian had
standing to file on behalf of Ms. Neilson.93 The federal appellate
court determined that the guardian did have standing under
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43 and found that Ms.
Neilson had a constitutionally protected liberty interest in both
"avoiding the stigma of being found incompetent" and "in
retaining personal control over the litigation."9 4 She could not be
deprived of these interests without proper procedural due process
88. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1207 (Consol. Supp. 2005). In fact, the New York rule does
not permit application for settlement by a guardian ad litem; a general guardian or
guardian of the property must be appointed in order to pursue settlement on behalf
of the litigant. Id.
89. Neilson, 199 F.3d at 649.
90. Id.
91. Id. The dissent notes that this holding was in derogation of New York's
rule and was apparently based on the trial court's generalized concern that the case
would be unduly delayed if the parties were required to wait until a general
guardian could be appointed and have time to review the proposed settlement. Id.
at 664 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The dissent further notes that this fear appeared
unfounded, since the general guardian was appointed just nine days after the
settlement was approved. Id. at 664 n.5. In addition, the dissent noted that the
guardian ad litem had apparently had "very little interaction with Neilson and thus
had virtually no first-hand knowledge of her personal situation or financial means."
Id. at 664.
92. Neilson, 199 F.3d at 649-50.
93. Id. at 650.
94. Id. at 651.
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pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.95 In determining what process
was due to Ms. Neilson, the court referred to Mathews v.
Eldridge.9 6 In analyzing the first factor under Eldridge, the court
apparently agreed that Ms. Neilson's liberty interests were in fact
important and compelling. 97 The third factor, the government's
interest, is not specifically discussed, but presumably lies in
efficient, expeditious, and low cost administration of the judicial
process.98 Ms. Neilson's position on appeal was that a formal
evidentiary hearing should have been conducted before
appointment of the guardian ad litem.99  Under the second
Eldridge factor, which concerns the analysis of "the risk of
erroneous deprivation" using the existing procedure versus the
"probable value . . . of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards,"100 the court found this level of procedure to be
unnecessary in this case.101 In the first place, the court found that
because Ms. Neilson was now being represented at the appellate
level by a guardian, she could not be heard to challenge as
erroneous her status at the trial level as someone "judicially
found to be incompetent" for purposes of appointment of a
guardian ad litem.102 Logically, the happenstance of a subsequent
appointment of a general guardian for a litigant would not appear
to mandate a finding that the litigant was incompetent at any
point prior to the appointment. Even more importantly, such a
subsequent appointment would not appear to rectify any due
95. Id.
96. Id. The Eldridge Court established a balancing test for determining the
constitutional adequacy of procedures intended to satisfy due process. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). Courts must weigh the following three
factors: "First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail." Id. at 335.
97. Neilson, 199 F.3d at 651.
98. See Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
99. Neilson, 199 F.3d at 651-52.
100. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.
101. Neilson, 199 F.3d at 654.
102. Id. at 652.
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process deficits that may have existed in the procedures used by
the trial court for appointing a guardian ad litem. Nevertheless,
the appellate court treated the lack of due process as a sort of
harmless error, particularly since the district court had imposed
"1post-appointment safeguards" which were sufficient, in the
court's opinion, to cure any due process deficits occasioned by
the lack of a hearing and deprivation of the right to examine the
expert's report, which was being considered by the court as
evidence in support of the appointment.103  The safeguards
contemplated by the appellate court evidently consisted of the
district court's ability to remove the guardian ad litem and its
oversight in approving the final settlement arranged between the
guardian ad litem and Colgate.' 1 How these measures could in
any way remove the constitutional infringement on Ms. Neilson's
right to decide what was in her own best interests is not
explained.
In short, the majority's discussion of the Eldridge factors
and its determination that sufficient due process was afforded to
Ms. Neilson simply is not convincing. The dissent took issue
with both the quality of the notice provided to Ms. Neilson to
alert her to the district court's contemplated appointment of a
guardian ad litem and the lack of an opportunity for Ms. Neilson
to be heard in opposition to such an appointment.s05 The dissent
further noted that the trial court's oversight after the guardian ad
litem's appointment did not operate to cure the procedural
defects.106 The dissent argued that at minimum Ms. Neilson
should have been "informed that she had a liberty interest at
stake . . . that if she was found incompetent and a guardian ad
103. Id.
104. Id. at 652-56.
105. Id. at 659 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 660-61. Judge Sotomayor, the author of the dissent, noted that Ms.
Neilson repeatedly asked for appointment of counsel, and had she understood that
she had a choice with respect to the appointment of the guardian ad litem, she
might well have taken different steps that would have preserved her cause of
action. Id. at 660. Instead, her discrimination claims were jettisoned without any
meaningful examination of the merits, particularly with respect to her claim of
retaliation. Id. at 663, 665-66.
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litem was appointed, she would lose all authority to make
decisions concerning her own case." 07
The In re Sara D. court, discussed above, also observed that
no case law set out the proper procedures to be followed in
appointing a guardian ad litem.108 The In re Sara D. court found
this to be understandable since most appointments are either a
matter of law, as when appointments are made for minors, or are
consensual.109 In situations where there is no consent, or there
can be no valid consent due to the litigant's alleged diminished
capacity, the court found the absence of procedural guidelines to
be troubling, since the appointment of a guardian ad litem
generally confers "broad powers" on the one appointed.no The
guardian ad litem essentially takes on the decision-making role
with power to "control the lawsuit.""' Without attempting to
issue a ruling that would govern all parental rights cases, the
court determined that due process at least required an explanation
by the court to the mother of why a guardian ad litem was being
sought and required an informal hearing where the litigant for
whom a guardian ad litem was being requested could be heard in
opposition to the request. 112 Even these minimal procedural
safeguards were not accorded to the mother.113 Of course, all
litigants, not just those involved in child custody cases, are
adversely affected by the loss of decision-making control and the
stigma of a finding of diminished capacity.114 Therefore, the
absence of minimal procedural safeguards governing the
appointment of guardians ad litem pursuant to Federal Rule 17(c)
and similar state rules should be rectified to protect the due
107. Id. at 659.
108. In re Sara D., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909, 914 (Ct. App. 2001).
109. Id.
110. Id. These powers include "controlling procedural steps necessary to the
conduct of the litigation, making stipulations or concessions with court approval,
waiving the right to a jury trial, and controlling trial tactics." Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 917-18.
113. Id. at 917.
114. See Christy Holmes, Surrogate Decisionmaking in the 90s: Learning to Respect
Our Elders, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 605, 610 (1997).
20 [Vol. 8
"WHENEVER JUSTICE REQUIRES"
process rights of all litigants whose capacity may be questioned.
QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTED GUARDIANS AD LITEM
In addition to the lack of procedural guidance, Federal Rule 17(c)
is bereft of any qualification criteria for those appointed as
guardians ad litem.n5 This is not entirely true of the state rules.
Several states require that guardians ad litem be attorneys,116 and
several states require the person appointed be "competent,"
"responsible" and "discreet."117  Finally, a couple of states
impose restrictions designed to preserve impartiality and
objectivity,118 and a few states require the posting of a bond by
the guardian ad litem where the litigant's financial interests may
be impacted.l This hodge-podge of miscellaneous provisions
does not come close to providing any uniform standard. 120
In an excellent article examining the lack of procedural
safeguards that have plagued conservatorship and general
guardianship proceedings, attorneys Susan Haines and Jack
Campbell point out that even where states have provided for
appointment of a guardian ad litem to protect the interests of the
respondent in such proceedings, there is generally no requirement
that the person so appointed "possess any special skills,
knowledge, training, experience, or even that he or she be an
attomey."121 The Uniform Guardianship and Protective
115. See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
116. See R. ALA. SUP. CT. 17(d); MIss. R. Civ. P. 17; VA. CODE ANN. 8.01-9(A)
(Supp. 2000); W.VA. R. CIv. P. 17(c).
117. See MICH. CT. R. 2.201(E); N.C. R. Civ. P. 17; S.C. R. Civ. P. 17.
118. See R. ALA. SUP. CT. 17(d) (stating that the guardian ad litem cannot be
related by blood or marriage or be nominated by plaintiffs attorney); S.C. R. CIV. P.
17 (stating that the guardian ad litem cannot possess adverse interests or be
"connected with" the adverse party's lawyer).
119. See MINN. R. Civ. P. 17.02; MISS. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
120. Amendments to the Federal Rules currently proposed by the American Law
Institute also do not address these issues. See Lee H. Rosenthal, Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Restyled Rules 1-86, 42 A.L.I. - ABA
83 (2005) available at Westlaw, SK042 ALI-ABA 83.
121. Susan G. Haines & John J. Campbell, Defects, Due Process, and Protective
Proceedings: Are Our Probate Codes Unconstitutional?, 14 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 57, 93
(1999).
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Procedures Act of 1997 provides a modicum of additional
guidance by suggesting that "the court shall . . . appoint a
[visitor]," and "the [visitor] must be an individual having training
or experience in the type of incapacity alleged." 122 This suggests
that the visitor or guardian ad litem need not be an attorney but
must be someone familiar with Alzheimer's Disease, if that were
the incapacity involved, or with terminal cancer, if it had led to
physical debilitation sufficient to require appointment of a
general guardian. 123 The comments submitted by the drafting
committee recommend that the "visitor" be a "physician,
psychologist, . . . nurse, social worker, or individual with
pertinent expertise."124 Such a requirement is definitely logical
within the context of guardianship proceedings and might be
desirable within the wider context of all litigation involving an
incapacitated party since the difficulty in effectively
communicating with the incapacitated adult is generally one of
the issues that results in the need for appointment of the guardian
ad litem in the first place. 125 However, unless courts establish
permanent paid positions for such individuals, the cost and
scheduling difficulty of securing appointments of individuals
with this level of qualification would be prohibitive. 126
In addition, in the absence of legislation or regulation by the
various credentialing bodies, imposing a duty upon such
individuals to serve, courts would have no authority to appoint
doctors, psychologists, nurses, social workers, and others as
guardians ad litem without securing contractual agreements with
them to do so. In the best of all possible worlds, contract
122. U.G.P.P.A. § 305 (1997); 8A U.L.A. 354 (2003).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Johns & Krooks, supra note 40, at 199.
126. Physicians already are overworked and sleep-deprived. Thomas R.
McLean, The 80-Hour Work Week: Why Safer Patient Care Will Mean More Health Care
Is Provided by Physician Extenders, 26 J. LEGAL MED. 339, 361 (2005). In Tennessee,
physicians are exempted by statute from compulsory attendance under subpoena
for civil trials and must instead be deposed at their convenience for purposes of
providing testimony. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-9-101(6). Obviously, physicians are
too busy to accept routine appointments as guardians ad litem.
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physicians, psychologists, nurses, and social workers would be
available to the court for appointment as guardians ad litem. In
the real world, guardians ad litem will need to be either lawyers
or possibly lay persons with sufficient training to be conversant
in legal procedures and terminology, so as to fulfill the need for
someone who can assist the attorney representing the
incapacitated adult in making decisions vital to the case.
Alabama's rule, for example, requires that the guardian ad litem
possess the qualifications necessary "to represent the minor or
incompetent person in the capacity of an attorney or solicitor."127
Providing lawyers with continuing legal education on issues of
diminished capacity and the types of physical and mental
impairments that may be expected to lead to diminished capacity
is critical. 128 Ideally, this might lead to a program of certification
for guardians ad litem, the development and implementation of
which would enhance the quality of and provide uniformity in the
standards of eligibility for those appointed as guardians ad litem.
GUIDELINES FOR PERFORMANCE OF THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM
Federal Rule 17 sets out no specific guidelines to govern the
guardian ad litem's performance following appointment.129 This
is in contrast to the standards set out for guardians ad litem
appointed in child neglect, abuse, and dependency cases, which
now envision that the guardian ad litem will function as a lawyer,
advocating the position of the best interests of the child13o or
those provided under the Uniform Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Act, which require in-person visits to the
respondent, investigation of the respondent's personal and
127. R. ALA. SUP. CT. 17(d).
128. Excellent materials on capacity assessment have already been developed by
the American Bar Association in conjunction with the American Psychological
Association. HANDBOOK FOR LAWYERS, supra note 34. These materials could be
used on an interdisciplinary basis to educate attorneys and non-attorneys alike.
129. See FED. R. CIv. P. 17(c).
130. See ABA STANDARDS OF PRACTICE FOR LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT CHILDREN
IN ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES, supra note 23; see also Andy Shookhoff & Susan L.
Brooks, Protecting Our Most Vulnerable Citizens, TENN. B.J., June 2002, at 14.
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financial circumstances, and issuance of reports and
recommendations relating to same.131
Case law posits that courts that have appointed a Federal
Rule 17 guardian ad litern have a "continuing obligation to
supervise the guardian ad litem's work."132 Any substantive
decisions made by the guardian ad litem on behalf of the
incapacitated litigant and any settlement recommended by the
guardian ad litem are subject to the court's approval.133 In
addition, the court that appointed the guardian ad litem can act to
remove the guardian ad litem.M In Neilson, for example, the
district court was called upon to review the guardian ad litem's
work and to assess whether or not the guardian ad litem should
be removed in accord with the request made by Ms. Neilson and
her son's attorney.'35
Approval and removal are options available to the court and
represent the court's responsibility to protect the interests of an
incapacitated party by monitoring the performance of the agent
that the court has appointed to protect that party.136 Neither
option provides any specific guidance for the conduct of the
guardian ad litem in effectively performing his or her role.
Guardians ad litem appointed for minors and those appointed
within the context of general guardianship and conservatorship
proceedings receive much greater guidance pursuant to statute
and/or court rule;'37 the lack of any corollary guidelines for
Federal Rule 17 guardians ad litem is an anomaly that should be
corrected.'38 Since custody of the litigant and control of his or
her assets is not at issue in litigation outside of proceedings for
guardianship or conservatorship, the plethora of reports that are
131. U.G.P.P.A. §§ 305(c)-(e).
132. Neilson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 199 F.3d 642, 652 (2d Cir. 1999).
133. Dacanay v. Mendoza, 573 F.2d 1075, 1079 (9th Cir. 1978); Noe v. True, 507
F.2d 9, 12 (6th Cir. 1974).
134. Neilson, 199 F.3d at 652.
135. Id. at 664-66.
136. Id. at 652.
137. See Sherrill L. Rosen, Guardian Ad Litem Practice, 63 UMKC L. REV. 371, 377-
78 (1995).
138. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
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required within that context would be superfluous and should not
be imposed within the context of Federal Rule 17 appointments.
The Tennessee Supreme Court listed the tasks to be
performed by a guardian ad litem as follows: (1) to be
responsible for costs and liable for judgment, (2) to be the one
against whom the court can make and enforce orders, (3) to be
subject to punishment for contempt in the event of disobedience
or violation of court orders, (4) and, perhaps most importantly, to
look after, take care of, and protect the interests of the
incapacitated litigant.139 To adequately discharge these duties,
Federal Rule 17 guardians ad litem, at minimum, should meet
with the incapacitated litigant and with those family members or
acquaintances who are familiar with the litigant and conversant
with the litigant's background, beliefs, and preferences. To the
extent possible, the guardian ad litem should elicit from the
litigant as much guidance as the litigant is able to provide
concerning the lawsuit and how the litigant would like it to
proceed. A summation of the guardian ad litem's findings after
this investigation of the litigant's circumstances should be
submitted confidentially to the court; should there be questions
raised later, the report would establish the information and
factors upon which the guardian ad litem will have relied in
making his or her determinations on behalf of the litigant.
STANDARDS FOR DECISIONMAKING
Federal Rule 17(c) sets out no specific standard for making
decisions on behalf of the incapacitated person.140 The two
available standards for exercising decision making on behalf of
another person are best interests and substituted judgment.141 The
best interests standard is conservative and works to preserve the
status quo concerning personal lifestyle and finances and seeks to
implement traditional medical advice when pertinent to safeguard
139. Rankin v. Warner, 70 Tenn. 302, 304-05 (1879).
140. See FED. R. CIv. P. 17(c).
141. LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON MCCHRYSTAL BARNES, ELDER LAW: CASES
AND MATERIALS 505-06 (3d ed. 2003).
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the health and well-being of the individual.142 The best interests
standard also seeks to preserve the assets of the individual so as
to maximize security, stability, and financial well-being.143 These
things obviously are desirable from a fiduciary standpoint and
from the standpoint of one to whom the minor's care is entrusted.
Within the context of litigation involving an adult, however,
a solely best interests approach may not be appropriate because
considerations that may cause someone to bring a lawsuit are not
always grounded in the person's best interests. Parties may seek
a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, for example, to
rectify a past wrong and to prevent such wrongs in the future,
considerations which may not affect the individual party's
present best interests at all.
In Neilson, discussed above, Ms. Neilson's pursuit of her
discrimination claims never may have been in her "best
interests," at least from the standpoint of the court-appointed
psychiatrist that examined her.14 The psychiatrist believed that
Neilson's allegations were "the product of [her] illness," and
continuing to pursue the suit only fueled and strengthened her
paranoia.14 5 Be that as it may, Ms. Neilson took the initiative to
contact an attorney to file a lawsuit prior to her hospitalization,
and at least one lawyer from the firm continued to believe in the
viability of her legal claims, particularly as to the issue of
retaliation.146 Clearly, Ms. Neilson was at least partially
motivated by her desire to vindicate her rights and to redress the
wrong she felt had been inflicted upon her by Colgate.147 This
motivation represents a critical component of her personal values
and beliefs. In cases involving vindication of personal rights of
adults, as was the situation with Ms. Neilson, implementation of
a substituted judgment standard seems more appropriate than that
of a best interests standard for purposes of decision making on
142. Id. at 506.
143. Id.
144. Neilson v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 199 F.3d 642, 648 (2d Cir. 1999).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 665-66.
147. Id. at 646.
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behalf of the incapacitated litigant.
As suggested in the previous section, a guardian ad litem
should determine the values and beliefs of the incapacitated
litigant to approximate the judgments that the person would have
made. To accomplish this, he or she should first consult with the
litigant (to the extent that the litigant is able to communicate),
then interview all available family members, friends, and other
associates, and consult with any other sources such as social
workers, ministers, and others familiar with the litigant and the
litigant's beliefs. Although substituted judgment has been used
most often in situations involving health care decision making,
the factors that have been developed within that context can
easily be adapted to fit the arena of litigation.148 The guardian ad
litem's inquiries to the various information sources concerning
the incapacitated litigant should ascertain: (1) her expressed
wishes, (2) her religious beliefs, if relevant to the decision, (3)
the effect the decisions will have on her close relatives, (4) the
risk of adverse impact of the proposed decision versus
probability of desired outcome, and (5) the effect this risk/benefit
analysis would have had on the litigant's continued wish to
pursue the proposed course of action based on her past history of
decision making. 149
In most cases, having conducted the investigation, the
guardian ad litem will be able to reasonably determine the
litigant's wishes and desires for purposes of exercising
substituted judgment. Alternatively, if the litigant's wishes or
desires either cannot be determined or are irrational, the
information obtained will provide a basis for deciding the course
that will be in the litigant's best interests.
148. FROLIK & BARNES, supra note 141, at 507-08.
149. See M. Garey Eakes et al., Planning Lessons Learned From End-of-Life Disputes,
17 NAELA Q. 21, 22 (2004) (citing the substituted judgment factors from Brophy v.
New England Sinai Hospital, Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 630 (Mass. 1986): "(a) Mr.
Brophy's expressed preferences; (b) [h]is religious convictions and their relation to
refusal of treatment; (c) [tihe impact on his family; (d) [pirobability of adverse side
effects; [and] (e) [p]rognosis - both with and without treatment").
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CONCLUSION
Shouldering the responsibility for decision making and
safeguarding the interests of an incapacitated client is a daunting
task, even within the relatively restricted context of a single
lawsuit.50  Representation of older clients necessarily entails
situations of diminished capacity and loss of decision-making
ability; when this occurs in the middle of litigation, recourse to
appointment of a guardian ad litem pursuant to Federal Rule
17(c) or one of its state equivalents is virtually unavoidable.'5'
The paucity of guidance for such appointments begins with the
Rule itself, which sets only the vaguest criteria for when
appointment is appropriate, establishes no procedures for
ensuring due process in such appointments, provides no guidance
for who should be appointed, and creates no standards for the
role itself.
As argued above, the importance of the role of a guardian ad
litem for those in need of such protection mandates that these
deficits be addressed. Recommendations include amendment of
Federal Rule 17(c) as follows: (1) to establish that appointment
of a guardian ad litem is only proper when the litigant is unable
to understand the nature of the proceedings and is unable to assist
in the management of the case, (2) to provide adequate due
process procedures to ensure that the litigant is advised of what is
going on and of her right to oppose the appointment, (3) to create
qualifications for persons appointed as guardians ad litem, so that
at a minimum such persons would be required to have training in
the law or experience relating to incapacitated persons, (4) to
incorporate guidelines for performance by the guardian ad litem,
and finally, (5) to explicitly declare the standard to be used for
making decisions on behalf of the incapacitated litigant. If such
changes are implemented, or similar changes designed to address
150. See James M. Peden, The Guardian Ad Litem Under the Guardianship Reform
Act: A Profusion of Duties, a Confusion of Roles, 68 U. DET. L. REV. 19, 24 (1990).
151. See Jeanette Zelhof et al., Protecting the Rights of Litigants with Diminished
Capacity in the New York City Housing Courts, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL'Y, & ETHICS J.
733, 738 (2004).
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the problems that exist, the role of the guardian ad litem may be
transformed from one of an elusive and amorphous character to
one that truly is what justice requires.

